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TENTH ANNUAL GROTIUS LECTURE
RESPONSE
FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY AND
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, FURTHER
REFLECTIONS *
DAVID SCHEFFER **

Esteemed colleagues—Isaiah prophesized, “And the loftiness of
man shall be bowed down, and the haughtiness of man shall be made
low . . . .” 1 That prophecy has borne truth in our collective
experience since the end of the Cold War. If we have learned
anything as international lawyers during these turbulent years, it
must be that the darkest and most evil elements of the human
character can overwhelm all logic and argument to bring each of
us—regardless of character or brilliance—to his or her knees. That
reality is not difficult to grasp when one witnesses the butchered
victims of a massacre on a hillside in Africa. It compels the deepest
sense of humility and yet inspires the belief that the law—that sacred
trust our predecessors crafted—and the victims of atrocity crimes
deserve better from us.
* Distinguished Discussant for Tenth Annual Grotius Lecture Series,
delivered to the 102nd Annual Meeting of the American Society of International
Law, Washington, DC, April 9, 2008.
** The author is the Mayer Brown/Robert A. Helman Professor of Law and
Director of the Center for International Human Rights at Northwestern University
School of Law. He is a member of the New York, District of Columbia, and
Supreme Court Bars and formerly served as the U.S. Ambassador at Large for War
Crimes Issues (1997-2001).
1. Isaiah 2:17 (King James).
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Prince Zeid delivered that message this afternoon with the
eloquence and insight for which he has come to be so highly
respected during the last decade. When he spoke of how one
individual—Richard Goldstone—acted courageously to indict both
Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic in those desperate days of early
1995, 2 and thus helped change the dynamic in the Balkans, he was
unwittingly describing the type of person he himself represents.
Prince Zeid, with persistent, steady leadership, has acted with a
different kind of courage in the service of Jordan, and of
international criminal law. He was not obligated to plunge into the
muddy waters of our profession or lead the Assembly of States
Parties of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) during its initial
three years. He could have been a conventional distinguished
diplomat from the Middle East. Instead, he made and continues to
make enormous contributions to the pursuit of international justice
and peacekeeping and we are privileged to have him on the world
stage. Mark my words, sitting before you is a future SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations.
I intend to focus on four issues in Prince Zeid’s lecture: the role of
lawyers in the service of their nation within the realm of political
expediency; the significance of the victims; amnesties; and the end of
impunity for atrocity crimes, namely, genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and aggression.
Prince Zeid posits a central question: whether lawyers are
consigned to do the dirty work “for the love of country” or on behalf
of political expediency to the detriment of the law, and particularly
of international criminal law. 3 The best example of this point is the
resurrection of criminal conduct that many of us thought was
obliterated by our legal system years ago. Now we are burdened by
2. See Prosecutor v. Karadzic & Mladic, Case No. IT-95-5-1, Initial
Indictment, ¶¶ 47-54 (July 24, 1995) (charging Radovan Karadzic and Ratko
Mladic with genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of the laws of war).
See also RICHARD J. GOLDSTONE, FOR HUMANITY: REFLECTIONS OF A WAR
CRIMES INVESTIGATOR 101-03 (2000) (describing the intense political pressures
facing Justice Goldstone in moving forward with the Karadzic and Mladic
indictments in accordance with his role as an independent prosecutor).
3. See Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid al-Hussein, Ambassador of the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan to the United States of America, Address, For Love of Country
and International Criminal Law, 24 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 647 (2009) (outlining
the issues arising when ideas of identity and nationality conflict with
responsibilities under international law).
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allegations of torture and cruel and degrading treatment of detainees,
and by the legal rationales for such practices, inflicted “for the love
of country” during the so-called war on terror. 4
We have exhibits for the ages in Professor John Yoo, formerly of
the Department of Justice (“DoJ”), Office of Legal Counsel; federal
judge Jay Bybee, who was Yoo’s boss at DoJ; David Addington,
former counsel and chief of staff to the Vice President Dick Cheney;
former Attorney General and former White House Counsel Alberto
Gonzales; former Department of Defense General Counsel William
James Haynes; and the Bush Administration’s lingering futile
nominee to head the Office of Legal Counsel, Steven Bradbury. 5
4. See generally PHILIPPE SANDS, TORTURE TEAM: RUMSFELD’S MEMO AND
BETRAYAL OF AMERICAN VALUES 3-5 (2008) (chronicling the development
and circulation of the Haynes memo, which provided the legal basis for the use of
interrogation techniques contradictory to international law and military practice);
Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House,
105 COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1685 (2005) (noting that the legal basis for using
torture as an interrogation technique was recognized by government officials and
prominent legal scholars, all of whom implied that either the Geneva Conventions
did not apply to those captured during the war on terror or that torture without risk
to life or health was an acceptable interrogation technique); JORDAN J. PAUST,
BEYOND THE LAW: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S UNLAWFUL RESPONSES IN THE
"WAR" ON TERROR 23-24 (2007) (characterizing the actions of government
lawyers and officials in recommending and authorizing alternative interrogation
techniques as willful violations of the Geneva Conventions and, ultimately, as war
crimes); JACK L. GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT
INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 189-191 (2007) (recognizing that the
potentialities of inaction drive national security officials to act “aggressively and
preemptively” when faced with terrorist threats, regardless of the implications of
their actions). See also Christopher Kutz, Torture, Necessity and Existential
Politics, 95 CAL. L. REV. 235, 240 (2007) (underscoring CIA concern that
interrogation techniques such as water boarding would subject CIA personnel to
penalties under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, which implemented the United Nations
Convention Against Torture). But see Symposium, Extraordinary Powers in
Ordinary Times: Human Rights Outlaws: Nuremberg, Geneva, and the Global
War on Terror, 87 B. U. L. REV. 427, 466 (2007) (noting that although physicians,
lawyers, and military officers are especially well-suited to prevent torture, thus far
those responsible for violations of international humanitarian law in the war on
terror have not been stripped of their rights to practice as professionals).
5. Professor John Yoo prepared a legal memorandum urging the Bush
Administration to reconsider its “recognition of the rules imposed by the Geneva
Convention” with regard to the interrogation of the Al Qaeda and Taliban
prisoners. Waldron, supra note 4, at 1684. While serving in the Department of
Justice, Jay S. Bybee prepared a legal memorandum recommending that the Bush
Administration’s definition of torture be limited to “the infliction of the sort of
extreme pain that would be associated with death or organ failure.” Id. at 1685.
THE
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None of these individuals had distinguished backgrounds in
international law and yet each one practiced within the complex and
rapidly developing fields of international humanitarian and criminal
law. The public record appears to show that these lawyers—perhaps
with honest but grossly misguided intentions—did exactly what was
required of them to fulfill the expedient objectives of their political
masters. 6 Political and military leaders and intelligence officials
needed legal cover and they got it with memoranda authored by midlevel lawyers whose superiors marveled at the simplicity of the
analysis which blithely ignored precedents of established federal and
international law. Other government and military lawyers resisted the
temptations of political expediency, and they deserve recognition for
their efforts to rebut the onslaught of accommodating memoranda. 7
Re-interpretation—particularly of treaties and of statutes—often
opens the gateway to political expediency. The world experienced
this during the ABM Treaty re-interpretation debate of the 1980’s,
where government lawyers with no background in international law
re-interpreted a major treaty using rationales that took years to
correct. 8 The Iran-Contra scandal also had its share of re-interpreted
David S. Addington “helped to shape an August 2002 opinion from the Justice
Department's Office of Legal Counsel that said torture might be justified in some
cases.” Douglas Jehl, In Cheney’s New Chief, a Bureaucratic Master, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 2, 2005, at A1. During his time at the White House, former U.S. Attorney and
White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales produced a memorandum to President
Bush on the use of alternative interrogation techniques and is considered one of the
architects of the Bush Administration’s policies towards detainees. R. Jeffrey
Smith & Dan Eggen, Gonzales Helped Set Course for Detainees, WASH. POST,
Jan. 5, 2005, at A01. William J. Haynes produced the Department of Defense
memorandum providing a legal justification for the use of alternative interrogation
techniques. SANDS, supra note 4, at 3-5. Steven Bradbury wrote a series of
classified Department of Justice legal memoranda thought to promote the use of
waterboarding and other alternative interrogation techniques. Scott Shane,
Waterboarding Focus of Inquiry by Justice Dept., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2008, at
A1.
6. See, e.g., Jane Mayer, The Memo: How an Internal Effort to Ban the Abuse
and Torture of Detainees Was Thwarted, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 27, 2006, at 32
(illustrating the close connection between William J. Haynes, the general counsel
of the Department of Defense, and Vice President Richard Cheney’s chief of staff,
David Addington).
7. See, e.g., id. (detailing the story of Alberto J. Mora, the former general
counsel of the United States Navy, who consistently voiced his opposition to the
policies of the Department of Defense and the Bush Administration but was unable
to overcome the influence of more powerful political figures).
8. See David J. Scheffer, Nouveau Law and Foreign Policy, 76 FOREIGN
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federal statutes. 9 More recently—in addition to the torture
memoranda—political interpreters manipulated the texts of relevant
U.N. Security Council Resolutions on Iraq, 10 the 2002 law on
Authorization to Use Military Force, 11 and the Geneva Conventions
of 1949 12 in order to legitimize a war of choice, authorize highly
intrusive wiretapping of Americans, and create a novel regime to
classify and handle combatants with an arrogance towards long-held
interpretations of the law that invites disbelief. 13 Even the 2002
POL’Y 44, 48-54 (1989) (noting that none of the lawyers interpreting the ABM
Treaty had specialization in international law and that their subsequent
interpretation resulted in weakened confidence on behalf of foreign governments
negotiating with the United States).
9. See David J. Scheffer, U.S. Law and the Iran-Contra Affair, 81 AM. J.
INT’L L. 696, 698 (1987) (detailing five statutes reinterpreted during the IranContra Scandal: the Arms Export Control Act, the Export Administration Act of
1979, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the National Security Act of 1947, and
the Hostage Act of 1868).
10. Security Council Resolutions 678, 687, and 688, promulgated in 1991
during the first Gulf War, formed the basis of the Joint Resolution to Authorize the
Use of United States Armed Forces Against Iraq, issued on Oct. 2, 2002, which
permitted the U.S. to use military force against Iraq. Press Release, The White
House, George W. Bush, Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States
Armed Forces Against Iraq (Oct. 2, 2002), available at http://www.white
house.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021002-2.html. For the text of the resolutions,
see S.C. Res. 678, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990); S.C. Res. 687, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/687 (Apr. 3, 1991); S.C. Res. 688, U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 (Apr. 5,
1991). Security Council Resolution 1373 prohibited U.N. member states from
providing material or financial support to terrorists, and Security Council
Resolution 1441 found Iraq in violation of its responsibilities to comply with its
disarmament obligations and provided for oversight of disarmament by U.N. and
IAEA authorities. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001); S.C.
Res. 1441, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (Nov. 8, 2002).
11. See PAUST, supra note 4, at 91-92 (arguing that the Authorization for Use
of Military Force, contrary to the Bush Administration’s interpretation, authorized
the use of force only for acts committed prior to the September 11, 2001, attacks).
For the text of the Authorization, see Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of
United States Armed Forces Against Iraq, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1541 (2002).
12. See THOMAS E. RICKS, FIASCO: THE AMERICAN MILITARY ADVENTURE IN
IRAQ 239-40 (2006) (noting that even the authors of the memoranda
recommending alternative interrogation techniques acknowledged that some
countries may argue that they may be in violation of the Geneva Conventions).
13. See JOSEPH MARGULIES, GUANTÁNAMO AND THE ABUSE OF PRESIDENTIAL
POWER 11-14 (2006) (underscoring that rather than a “carefully reasoned legal
judgment,” the Bush Administration’s position on the rights of detainees was an
unprecedented legal position with no base in domestic or international law);
GOLDSMITH, supra note 4, at 144 (highlighting the conclusion by the Department
of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel that a 1994 statute criminalizing torture
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Article 98(2) bilateral non-surrender agreements between the United
States and nations joining the International Criminal Court suffer
from the Bush Administration’s re-interpretation of the Rome
Statute. 14 The idea that Article 98(2) of the Rome Statute was
intended by the negotiators, who included Prince Zeid and me, to
cover any and all nationals of a State (such as mercenaries, private
contractors, tourists, journalists, and business travelers), rather than
only the official personnel of the “sending State,” which in treaty law
has a very clear meaning, reflects the kind of overreaching that
political re-interpreters practice. 15
Re-interpretation tactics are fodder for much academic discourse.
Legal scholars debate the merits of the conventional interpretation
against the freshly-minted unconventional interpretation. 16 But it is
exceptionally tempting to essentially re-write the law in order to
achieve politically expedient ends—and lawyers are the authors of
the process from start to finish. While Prince Zeid was stationed in
Croatia with U.N. peacekeepers from 1994 to 1996, I spent the first
term of the Clinton Administration in the Situation Room of the
White House as an official representing the U.S. Mission to the
violated the President’s Commander-in-Chief powers under the Constitution,
thereby justifying non-compliance); PAUST, supra note 4, at 20-21 (asserting that
because the Constitution and the courts require that the president uphold customary
international law, the Department of Justice memos justifying such violations were
unfounded and unprofessional distortions of the law).
14. See David Scheffer, Article 98(2) of the Rome Statute: America’s Original
Intent, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 333, 337-46 (2005) (contending that the original
intent of the U.S. was to preserve the effect of status of forces agreements (SOFAs)
and status of missions agreements (SOMAs), which guide criminal investigations
and prosecution of government personnel abroad, rather than provide protection to
all U.S. nationals).
15. See id. at 347 (explaining that the International Law Commission, in
commenting on the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, defined a “sending
State” as the state which a consulate represents in a foreign jurisdiction, implying
that those protected by the sending state are government officials and not nationals,
as the Bush Administration argued).
16. See, e.g., John Norton Moore, Treaty Interpretation, the Constitution and
the Rule of Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 163, 188 (2001) (recognizing two primary
practices for interpreting treaties in the United States, a unitary approach based
solely on the intent of the parties and a dual approach based on intent and foreign
relations law); Alex Glashausser, Difference and Deference in Treaty
Interpretation, 50 VILL. L. REV. 25, 28 (2005) (recognizing the inherent tension
between the United States Department of State and the International Court of
Justice over treaty interpretations as well as the debate over which interpretation
should be followed by U.S. courts).
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United Nations on the Deputies Committee of the National Security
Council. I emerged from that experience frustrated enough to
speculate—perhaps foolishly—about an American foreign policy
grounded in the enforcement of international law and the
advancement of the nation’s global rather than solely national
interests. That would require some fundamental shifts in how our
foreign policy is conceived, strategized, implemented, and defended.
It would require a real commitment to assertive multilateralism, a
term I proposed to my boss, Ambassador Madeleine Albright, in
1993, to the unending shock of certain Members of Congress and
commentators who kept interchanging “assertive” as “aggressive.” 17
Perhaps a re-born assertive multilateralism, whereby the U.S.
Government would more effectively use its influence and power
within international institutions and among newly carved coalitions
of nations to achieve collective responses to global challenges, would
help salvage what is left of our foreign policy after the last seven
years.
But such visions are difficult even when political expediency is
dictated by leaders whom you, as a lawyer, strongly believe should
hold positions of governmental power. During the Clinton
Administration, I witnessed many policy decisions that distanced the
United States from opportunities to advance noble principles of
international law. As with other administrations, the State
Department’s regional political bureaus exercised paramount
influence in Clinton-era policy discussions, as did the Pentagon and
the National Security Council. Political expediency, if we understand
it to mean the primacy of political machinations over objective legal
reasoning—particularly where the enforcement of law truly
matters—disastrously crippled America’s response to the Rwandan
genocide, 18 blocked any serious effort to achieve Russian
17. See Madeleine K. Albright, U.S. Sec’y of State, Myths of Peace-Keeping,
Statement before the Subcomittee on International Security, International
Organizations, and Human Rights of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs
(Jun. 24, 1993), in DEP’T ST. DISPATCH, June 1993 (underscoring that in an era of
“multilateral engagement and U.S. leadership within collective bodies” assertive
multilateralism through preventive diplomacy and intervention in failing states is
necessary to maintain international peace and security).
18. See David J. Scheffer, A Look Back: Lessons from the Rwandan Genocide,
5 GEO. J. INT’L AFF. 125, 126 (2004) (acknowledging the multiple domestic and
international political issues that prevented the United States and the United
Nations from responding effectively to the Rwandan genocide); SAMANTHA
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accountability for the atrocity crimes unleashed in Chechnya, 19 and
held U.S.-Turkish relations hostage to the historical significance of
the atrocities suffered by Armenians during the early Twentieth
Century. 20 It thwarted effective measures to apprehend indicted
fugitives Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic in the Balkans,
prevented the introduction of NATO ground forces to Kosovo when
they were desperately needed, and prohibited strong diplomatic
pressure on Zimbabwian President Robert Mugabe to extradite
former Ethiopian dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam to Addis Ababa to
stand trial for his atrocity crimes. Political expediency, often
translated as American exceptionalism, was not unknown to
American lawyers—myself included—negotiating the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court and its supplemental
documents. 21
I agree with Prince Zeid that the victims hold the keys to whether
a society will restore itself following atrocities. They are the central
purpose for why the International Criminal Court exists. As he says,

POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 329-90
(2002) (describing U.S. response to the early signs of the Rwandan genocide as
uninformed and slow because the U.S. did not perceive Rwanda as a national
security threat); JOHN SHATTUCK, FREEDOM ON FIRE: HUMAN RIGHTS WARS &
AMERICA’S RESPONSE 21-76 (2003) (arguing that the Clinton Administration failed
to respond adequately to the crisis in Rwanda because the Administration viewed
the conflict through the lens of the Cold War, in which involvement was only
necessary to protect strategic interests, and because the Administration
misconstrued the lessons learned from the failed intervention in Somalia).
19. See Human Rights Watch, Who’s Afraid of Vladimir Putin?, Sept. 23,
2003,
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2003/09/25/whos-afraid-vladimir-putin
(suggesting that U.S. policy toward Russia is guided by its desire to acquire an ally
in the war on terror, to maintain good relations with Russian leadership, and to
gain support within the international community).
20. See, e.g., Sebnem Arsu & Sabrina Tavernise, Turkey Authorizes Troops to
Enter Iraq to Fight Rebels, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2007, at A10 (underscoring the
connection between U.S. non-recognition of the Armenian genocide, U.S.-Turkish
relations, and U.S. military strategy in Iraq).
21. See David J. Scheffer, Staying the Course with the International Criminal
Court, 35 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 47, 53-55 (Nov. 2001-Feb. 2002) (recognizing that
despite U.S. opposition to the Rome Statute and the International Criminal Court
as against U.S. national interests, the United States stands to gain from ratifying
the Rome Statute given the protections it would provide to U.S. personnel and the
voice it would be granted in shaping the application of the Statute).
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“[W]e build a criminal court for the victims. . .” 22 I would temper his
points with some further reflections. Representatives of victims may
assume significant roles during prosecutions before the ICC and,
indeed, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
where former senior Khmer Rouge leaders appear destined to face
trial soon. 23 But the ICC can offer only the possibility of restorative
justice with reparations, if any, paid out of a convicted defendant’s
assets or from the court’s trust fund. 24
No one can say whether retributive justice trumps restorative
justice or vice versa in the mind of any particular victim. We do
know that the ICC is primarily a court of retribution against
individual perpetrators and, despite the unprecedented focus put on
the issue, only secondarily is it a court designed to address the
interests and needs of the victims. 25 The ICC cannot, indeed must
not, be burdened with the overwhelming restorative needs of the
victims. As my colleagues from the Criminal Division of the Justice
Department repeatedly counseled me during the ICC negotiations,

22. Zeid, supra note 3, at 657.
23. See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT 323-341 (2007) (outlining the protections provided to victims in
international criminal tribunals to make sure that their concerns and claims are
adequately enumerated). See generally David Boyle, The Rights of Victims:
Participation, Representation, Protection, Reparation, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 307
(2006) (detailing the protections and opportunities for victim participation in the
proceedings of the Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers).
24. See SCHABAS, supra note 23, at 337-41 (2007) (recognizing that although
the ICC is empowered to make a determination of damages and to order
reparations, the reparations ordered may come only from an individual—no order
may be issued against a state).
25. See Christine Chung, Victims’ Participation at the International Criminal
Court: Are Concessions of the Bench Fulfilling the Promise? 6 NW. J. INT’L HUM.
RTS. 459, 461 (2008) (discussing an ICC case in which the judge warned of the
potential impacts of broadening victims’ participation in light of the “fundamental
principles of criminal law,” which “do not link the status of the victim and
consequent rights of participation to the charges confirmed against the accused”);
Sam Garkawe, Victims and the International Criminal Court: Three Major Issues,
3 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 345, 346-47 (2003) (noting that in the first international
criminal tribunal statutes, neither the word “victim” nor rights of such a person
were mentioned).
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the Court cannot become a welfare agency, which is a cynical but
perhaps accurate point of view.
However, Prince Zeid’s focus on the victims is entirely
appropriate. I believe the yawning gap in how the international
community has addressed the needs of victims of atrocity crimes
arises most prominently amongst governments. Our distinguished
colleague and former president of this Society, Professor Tom
Franck, eloquently addressed the need to refocus our attention on
state responsibility and I lodge a similar plea today. 26
We begin, though, by recognizing that what has transpired in The
Hague, Arusha, and Freetown, defendant by defendant, has created
an impressive body of jurisprudence that already has transformed
international criminal law and should aid the goals of deterrence
during the Twenty-First Century. 27 The ICC’s true value is in its
capacity, ideally, to help prevent atrocity crimes in order to save
millions from experiencing the fate of victims already brought low
by the violence and destruction that define such international crimes.
But what of the aftermath? Despite the work of the International Law
Commission in preparing the draft articles on state responsibility for
internationally wrongful acts, 28 no normative basis exists for state
responsibility towards victims of atrocity crimes, whereby judgments
of guilt arising from the ICC can be translated into the responsibility
of the governments that hoisted the perpetrators onto the battlefields
or the killing fields. 29

26. See generally Thomas Franck, Individual Criminal Liability and Collective
Civil Responsibility: Do They Reinforce or Contradict One Another? 6 WASH. U.
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 567 (2007) (positing that state responsibility for acts of
genocide must be recognized despite trends towards holding only individuals
accountable).
27. See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE U.N. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNALS: THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, RWANDA AND SIERRA LEONE 44 (2006)
(underscoring that although the law guiding the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda differs,
the decisions of both courts will play a significant role in guiding the International
Criminal Court).
28. See generally U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (Apr. 23-June 1
and Jul. 2-Aug. 10, 2001) [hereinafter Report on the Work of the 53d Session]
(enumerating the draft provisions concerning state responsibility for violations of
international law as well as the concerns of the drafters).
29. See David Scheffer, The World Court’s Fractured Ruling on Genocide, 2
GENOCIDE STUD. AND PREVENTION 123 (2007).
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Restorative justice for the victims may begin in the courtroom, but
it will be achieved within these devastated societies only if the
executive and legislative branches of governments are obligated by
treaty or compelled by moral suasion to bear the requisite costs
associated with the victims. I have no easy formula for achieving this
objective. For there can be no return to the punitive reparations that
so crippled Germany after World War I and that Adolf Hitler
exploited to stoke the misery and pride of his nation for his own
aggressive and genocidal aims. 30 One of the next great challenges in
our profession will be determining how to transform the remarkable
progress in individual criminal responsibility achieved during the last
fifteen years by the international criminal tribunals into a more
obligatory role by the same governments who ordered these
atrocities. How can international criminal law be used to compel
governments to comply with international law as well as to accept
their own responsibility for the needs of the victims against whom
their own leaders are proven to have waged atrocity crimes? More
often than not the perpetrator government will have few if any
resources to share with the victims in the aftermath of war or a
campaign of atrocities. 31 So our challenge is steep and complex in its
ramifications, but we must set our sights on it.
As a modest initial step, I would suggest examining the merits of a
non-binding General Assembly resolution which would express the
common view of the international community that where the political
or military leaders of a nation are convicted by the International
Criminal Court, that nation should voluntarily shoulder some

30. See RODERICK STACKELBERG, HITLER'S GERMANY: ORIGINS,
INTERPRETATIONS, LEGACIES 241 (1999) (recognizing the steep decline in the
standard of living in Germany, characterized by malnutrition, starvation, and
disease, resulting from policies seeking to demilitarize Germany as well as the
expulsion of Germans from other European states); JACKSON J. SPIELVOGEL,
HITLER AND NAZI GERMANY: A HISTORY 10-28 (1988) (detailing the political,
economic, and social issues in Weimar Germany that facilitated Hitler’s rise and
the popularity of his racist and anti-Semitic policies).
31. Cf. Irene Melup, The United Nations Declaration on Principles of Justice
for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, in THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS: FIFTY YEARS AND BEYOND 59-60 (Yael Danieli et al. eds., 1999)
(detailing U.N. recommendations for implementing the United Nations Declaration
on Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power and noting that
most states lack the resources for implementation).
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responsibility, within the limits of its capabilities, towards the needs
of the victims of the atrocity crimes. 32
I conclude with some comments on the fate of amnesties and the
denial of impunity represented by Article 27 of the Rome Statute.
Prince Zeid correctly signals the demise of amnesties and the
unprecedented commitment of Article 27, but I would offer the
following clarification. 33 The end of impunity, and hence the end of
amnesties fortifying impunity, has arrived for political and military
leaders who commit atrocity crimes. I do not mean to suggest that
impunity will not be realized by such leaders in the future or that
national amnesties will not be negotiated to secure their withdrawal
from public life. We can expect many atrocity lords to enjoy
impunity for years to come in the real world outside these walls. The
ICC is not a court of universal jurisdiction 34 and, as we were
reminded by the International Court of Justice in the Yerodia case,
head of state and diplomatic immunity remain powerful shields to
accountability before foreign criminal courts and in the absence of
obligations arising from participation in an international criminal
tribunal. 35
But the die has been cast. Each and every political and military
leader is on notice of the actual or potential reach of the law, that
policy-making and military strategizing cannot proceed in a vacuum
from legal consequences, and that the world is watching more
intently every day. Those leaders intimidated by this emerging reality
are most likely to seek refuge in re-interpretations of the law, in
exceptionalism, territorial isolation, or in the sheer clout of their
32. See Franck, supra note 28, at 571 (contending that states should assume
their burden of reconstituting victims regardless of whether individuals are held
liable for genocide as an essential part of the healing process).
33. See Zeid, supra note 3, at 660 (recognizing the importance of the Article
27, which precludes officials from signatory states from avoiding liability based on
official status, in moving away from the practice of granting amnesty to those
committing atrocity crimes).
34. But see SCHABAS, THE UN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, supra
note 27, at 60 (recognizing that “genocide, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes, . . . the core crimes of the Rome Statute” are commonly thought to be
crimes of universal jurisdiction).
35. See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002
I.C.J. 3 (Judgment of Feb. 14, 2002) (holding that Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Congo, was entitled to
diplomatic immunity from criminal jurisdiction under international law, despite
Belgium’s issuance of an arrest warrant).
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nation’s power on a regional or global stage. 36 But those tactics
increasingly will be seen for what they are and judged against the
Article 27 standard of accountability.
We also should recognize that amnesties still fulfill a function in
societies that cannot possibly bring to justice the thousands,
sometimes hundreds of thousands, of low-level foot soldiers
(military and civilian) who are the direct perpetrators of the crimes,
who determine the fate of each victim. 37 Sometimes such amnesties
are heavily conditioned with confessional and punitive options, as
well as with obligations to join with others in restorative justice.
They should be distinguished from leadership amnesties which
remain so tempting to the peace negotiators but which are
incompatible with international justice.
The fact that States Parties to the Rome Statute have embraced
Article 27 is a testament to civilization in our time. I am only one
voice, but I hope, for the love of country and of international
criminal law, that the United States of America has the courage to
join at least 106 other nations at the ICC in burying impunity along
with the violence, death, and destruction that the shield of impunity
has unleashed on countless victims, so many of whom seek to
survive and, as Secretary Albright often reflected, simply live normal
lives.
Sir Robert Peel, a British prime minister in the Nineteenth
Century, once exhorted his opponents to “elevate your vision.” 38
Today Prince Zeid elevated our vision to what should be our noblest
aspirations, and for that, Mr. Ambassador, we express our most
humble gratitude.

36. See Benjamin G. Davis, A Citizen Observer’s View of the U.S. Approach to
the War on Terror, 17 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 465, 477 (2008)
(describing the approach of the United States to international law as one based on
the “exercise of raw power politics on the international plane”).
37. See Charles P. Trumbull IV, Giving Amnesties a Second Chance, 25
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 283, 285 (2007) (recognizing that state leaders often use
amnesties to compensate for a lack of capacity to prosecute the high numbers of
perpetrators, as a way to halt ongoing human rights violations, and as a way to
move the peace process forward).
38. William Gladstone, You Cannot Fight Against the Future, in THE PENGUIN
BOOK OF HISTORIC SPEECHES 311 (Brian MacArthur ed., 1996).

